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A New Architecture?
At the annual meeting of the IMF and World Bank
this fall, finance ministers from a 22-country working
group discussed proposals aimed toward the ultimate
objective of creating a ￿new architecture￿ for the
world monetary system.  Reports from three working
groups were presented with suggestions for enhanc-
ing transparency and accountability, establishing stan-
dards for strengthening national financial systems,
and improving the management of future economic
crises.  Although fundamental reform of world financial
arrangements still is a long way off, it is worthwhile to
consider some basic construction principles we can
draw on from economic theory.
Whatever their scale and scope, financial markets
exist to channel funds from savers and lenders to the
most profitable business opportunities.  International
financial markets relax the constraints that link invest-
ment with domestic savings, and provide opportunities
for individual investors to globally diversify portfolios.
By efficiently allocating capital, a smoothly functioning
financial system can be an important element of eco-
nomic growth and development.
However, the smooth operation of financial markets
often is inhibited by problems associated with asymmet-
ric information.  That is, borrowers generally have better
information about the riskiness of their behavior than do
their creditors.  One particularly nefarious manifestation
of this problem is known as moral hazard.  If a borrower
is allowed unrestricted access to funding, there is an
incentive to engage in riskier behavior than would be
desirable from the lender￿s perspective.
To some extent, the very existence of banks and other
financial intermediaries reflects efforts to overcome
problems of moral hazard.  By specializing in origi-
nating and maintaining many loans, banks can exploit
economies of scale in monitoring borrowers.  To further
reduce the ability of borrowers to take undue risks, loan
contracts often contain collateral and net worth require-
ments, credit rationing and other restrictive covenants.
The existence of intermediaries doesn￿t entirely
solve problems of asymmetric information, however.
To the extent that owners and depositors fail to moni-
tor the intermediary itself, incentives for undue risk-
taking can simply move up the chain￿banks have
incentives to make risky bets with their depositors￿
funds.  This incentive also can be problematic when
government support and guarantees are present in the
form of features such as deposit insurance and access
to a lender-of-last-resort.  These government programs
have an implicit value, and financial institutions might
find it beneficial to engage in risky leverage of that
value as well.  Consequently, such government pro-
grams intended to limit systemic risk usually are
accompanied by portfolio and net worth requirements
for banks that parallel the restrictive covenants that
banks require of their borrowers.
In considering proposals for improving the man-
agement of financial crises, the same considerations
should be heeded.  Although we have seen how capi-
tal outflows can have disruptive effects, proposals to
restrict the flow of capital are likely to reduce the allo-
cational efficiency of financial markets.  On the other
hand, arrangements intended to mitigate the disruptive
effects of capital flows taking the form of implicit
guarantees or ￿bailouts￿ raise the potential for risky
leverage of the value of those guarantees.  That is,
moral hazard is just as much of a potential problem in
the worldwide economy as it is on smaller scales.  
Precautions need to be taken in any proposals for
reform to take account of these risks.  Nevertheless, it
is in the interest of all to make sure that global financial
markets are able to operate as efficiently as possible.
As proposals for a new architecture are evaluated, it
will be important to keep these sound construction
principles in mind.
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